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Ukraine has become known for episodes of dramatic political change. The massive street protests which forced President Viktor Yanukovych from power in 2014 have been dubbed the 'revolution of dignity' -a name which reflects Ukrainian citizens' desire for change that is deep, enduring and beneficial for the whole of society. Yet, the Ukrainian political system has also demonstrated considerable capacity to resist the kind of 'fundamental reordering' which the country requires if it is to become a stable and prosperous democracy.
To what extent have the old rules of Ukrainian politics been re-written since the 'revolution of dignity'? It has become axiomatic to say that Ukraine has achieved more reform progress since 2014 than in all the previous years of its independence. Moreover, the identity fault-line that used to divide voters in southern and eastern Ukraine from voters in the west and centre has been disrupted by Russia's gross violation of Ukrainian sovereignty in Donbas and Crimea: it seems that the Russian threat and territorial incursions have in some ways strengthened Ukrainian national unity. Familiar challenges do remain, however. Unaccountable elites continue to extract rents via weak and corrupt state institutions and state-owned enterprises. Vested interests influence political decision-making at the highest levels, which holds back reform and undermines public confidence in political processes.
This 'virtual' special issue of East European Politics & Societies and Cultures is an opportunity
to reflect on recent developments in Ukrainian politics in the context of existing scholarship. Ten articles have been selected for the special issue from previous volumes of EEPS, grouped around two broad themes: (1) understandings of the Ukrainian nation, and (2) institutions of the Ukrainian political system. This introductory essay discusses how the selected articles contribute to our understanding of Ukrainian politics and society. Each article in the 'virtual' collection serves as a reference point against which change and continuity since the 'revolution of dignity'
can be assessed.
Understandings of the Ukrainian nation: Identity, language and memories of the past
Yitzhak Brudny and Evgeny Finkel describe post-Soviet Ukraine as a place where different visions of national identity have coexisted, without any side becoming strong enough to impose a single vision on the country as a whole. They associate 'Western Ukrainian identity' with a desire for independence, use of the Ukrainian language, and strong anti-Communist feelings.
'Eastern Ukrainian identity', in contrast, assigned little importance to these issues and tended to coincide with support for close relations with Russia. Brudny and Finkel argue that competition between these visions generated an intense public discussion which ultimately strengthened Ukraine's democratic prospects, because it led substantial sections of the elite and public to adopt a democratic and liberal Ukrainian identity. They contrast Ukraine's experience against that of Russia, where a liberal-democratic national identity failed to become popular. popularised during the conflict via Ukrainian television channels and public billboards. The argument that 'language does not matter' fits with the finding, discussed above, that participation in the 'revolution of dignity' was not related to language identity. The fact that thousands of
Ukrainians from 'Russian-speaking' areas have voluntarily taken up arms in Donbas to defend their country is said to have boosted the concept of Russian-speaking Ukrainian patriotism -a change from previous years, when Ukrainian patriotism was more closely associated with speaking Ukrainian. The vast majority of Ukrainians continue to have at least passive fluency in both languages, and many can easily switch between the two, sometimes barely being aware that they are doing so.
On the other hand, the argument that 'language matters' has also been salient since 2014, because the language issue has taken on stronger security connotations. There is evidence that citizens who prefer to consume media content in Russian are significantly more likely to support the Russian government's narrative than citizens who prefer Ukrainian-language media and those who have no preference. The perception that Ukraine's vulnerability to malign Russian influence is at least partly attributable to widespread use of the Russian language has fuelled several legislative changes, most notably the new quotas for Ukrainian-language content on radio and television. Meanwhile, some formerly 'Russian-speaking' Ukrainian citizens have been converting to Ukrainian in their daily life of their own volition, as an expression of national allegiance. Bilaniuk echoes the findings of Kulyk in observing that neutrality in language choice is always elusive. Tolerant bilingualism may be the norm in people's day-to-day social interactions, but heated political debates around the language issue are unlikely to diminish "in a society at war with a neighbour using language as a partial justification for that war". The political elite's habit of playing on the logic of the 'two Ukraines' prior to 2014, rather than transcending it, created ideal conditions for Russian propagandists, whose prolific, emotional accounts of pro-Nazi 'Banderites' seizing power in Kyiv apparently found ready audiences in As with the new language legislation, proponents of these measures argue that they serve national security interests, in addition to symbolic historical justice. Ukraine's failure to question its Soviet heritage in previous years is said to have left the population vulnerable to Russian manipulation. The mass renaming exercise did not generate much in the way of public protest.
However, the moves to 'de-Sovietize' are very much an elite priority and not a popular one:
surveys suggest that most Ukrainians would rather have left the Communist-era place-names as they were. Russia's violation of Ukrainian sovereignty has united the majority of Ukrainian citizens against Putin and the Kremlin, but it has not sealed all the rifts in their memories of the past. The heavy-handed way in which the current government is interpreting history for its citizens, instead of encouraging thoughtful debate, effectively reinforces Russian propaganda messages about the 're-writing of history'. Such an approach will make it harder to convince residents of Donbas and Crimea that the democratic credentials of the government in Kyiv are genuine.
Institutions of the Ukrainian political system: Parliament, judiciary and the media
The success of the 'revolution of dignity' will probably be judged in the long term on the extent to which it delivers transformation in Ukraine's political institutions. The article by Paul D'Anieri selected for this 'virtual' special issue draws attention to important structural constraints which shaped how those institutions functioned prior to 2014. D'Anieri observes that Ukraine's regional diversity served as a barrier to the concentration of power by a dominant majority in parliament. The fact that no party managed to build strong cross-regional appeal or to establish an effective organisational base nationwide meant that parliamentary majorities almost 7 always required a coalition. Moreover, elites from different regions were constantly competing with one another, so that whenever a leader or party associated with one region tried to 'take over', they would always encounter resistance. Another constraint on the consolidation of power was the underperforming economy, which tended to sap support for political incumbents.
Ukraine lacks the kind of abundant natural resources (for example, big hydrocarbon reserves) which enable authoritarians in some parts of the world to buy themselves popular legitimacy.
Ukraine's incumbent power-holders were also unable to use belligerent foreign policy or a manufactured external threat to legitimise an authoritarian takeover -because there was no national consensus on who the 'enemies' were.
At the same time, D'Anieri notes that Ukraine's weak institutions provided "few barriers, and UA: Pershyy, which is being created from the old state-controlled channel Pershyy Natsionalnyy.
The new online channel Hromadske, run by a journalist collective, is producing high-quality investigative documentaries and more with funding from Western donors. The Ukrainian media system does not lack plurality, and there is good quality journalism available to most citizens who have the knowledge and inclination to look for it.
One aspect of Ukraine's media environment that has changed particularly rapidly since the 'revolution of dignity' is the level of Russian involvement and influence. The final article included in this 'virtual' special issue is my own, which investigated how Russian media owners and media partnerships affected news coverage about Russia that was produced for
Ukrainian audiences in 2010-2011. That article drew attention to complexities of Russian involvement in the Ukrainian media: it pointed out that not all news providers in Ukraine can be neatly categorised as either 'Russian' or 'Ukrainian', because some are financed, overseen, and produced by a combination of individuals in or from both Ukraine and Russia. Overall, news providers in Ukraine that had a Russian shareholder or partner were found to be more restrained in their criticism of Russia than comparable news providers without such Moscow connections.
However, in some cases, commercial interests and the demands of local audiences were influencing editorial policy at least as much as demands from Moscow.
My article from 2014 argued against viewing 'Russian' media in Ukraine (and indeed elsewhere) through the analytical lens of 'soft power'. This is not just a question of whether the adjective 'soft' is appropriate for describing their intended and actual impact. It is also because the soft power framework obscures diversity among 'Russian' media and the substantial influence of local pressures on content in some cases. Moreover, the soft power framework fails to allow for the fact that all media outlets, whatever their origin, are likely to evoke a range of responses from diverse (elite, mass and minority) audiences. To focus exclusively on the media's capacity to softly 'attract' is thus to ignore the bigger picture of varied reactions and counteractions that ensue when political messages cross borders from one country to another. 'persuasive' effect in Ukraine. In fact, the opposite seems to be true: tendentious and misleading
Russian reporting has alienated millions of Ukrainian citizens and provoked the Ukrainian government into taking effective countermeasures, which have greatly reduced Russia's capacity to influence Ukrainian public opinion.
Continuity and change in the aftermath of 'revolution'
In the years that followed the Orange revolution, a recurring question addressed in the literature was whether the events of 2004 deserved their 'revolutionary' epithet. The same question is likely to be asked about the 'revolution of dignity'. The articles showcased in this collection constitute a useful point of reference for scholars and students who seek to investigate the extent of continuity and change in Ukrainian politics after the extraordinary events of 2013-2014.
The regional differences in national identity, language use and historical memories that are described within this collection are far from losing their salience in Ukrainian politics. On the contrary, identity, language and memories of the past have acquired heightened security connotations for Ukraine in recent years, because Russia is using them to justify its support for separatism in Donbas and Crimea. The security context, along with the removal of voters in
Crimea and separatist-held Donbas from the electoral equation, has shifted the centre of Ukraine's politics 'westward' and allowed 'de-Russifying' and 'de-Sovietizing' policies on language and memory to proceed rapidly against much weaker opposition than in the past. These 13 changes are welcomed by people who hope Ukraine will 'escape' Russia's orbit -but they risk strengthening resistance to reintegration among citizens in the occupied territories.
The huge challenge facing Ukraine's democratic reformers is underlined by the articles in this collection that deal with institutions of the political system. Ever since the early 1990s, networks of patronage have shaped behaviour and decisions in the Ukrainian parliament, judiciary and media -enriching the elite and diverting state resources away from development. The 'revolution of dignity' brought some energetic new political actors into parliament, whose efforts (with support from civil society and Western governments) have delivered greater transparency and accountability in important areas. However, many 'old faces' at the highest levels are clearly reluctant to abandon patronage as a mechanism for retaining power and wealth. Elections remain vulnerable to the same kind of manipulation they suffered from in the past; the new court system may be undermined by the habits of old judges who cannot all be replaced overnight; the oligarch-owned TV channels continue to attract bigger audiences than smaller, newer, more independent media. Thus, the changes that have occurred in Ukrainian politics since 2014 have certainly been radical -but they are yet to secure the irreversible establishment of wellfunctioning democracy.
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